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In the last twenty years or so, the political interpretation of the free
speech clause, most clearly defended by Alexander Meiklejohn, has come
to occupy a central position in discussion of the First Amendment, both
within academic circles and in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.'
This is not to say that this paradigm has won universal acceptance.
Rather, it has attracted a wide spectrum of critics, who charge that the
theory is either too narrow in scope,' or overly instrumental in form,3 or
inappropriately consequ~ntialist in its scheme of justification."
The principal aim of this Note is to assess the significance these attacks
on the political interpretation of speech have for a proper understanding
of the First Amendment. The Note advances an alternative theory of free
speech that seeks to take account of the defects of the political approach
while retaining its central insight: namely, that our protection of free
speech is grounded in its function of sustaining a framework of uncon-
strained public discourse in which agents can deliberatively define their
purposes by reciprocally weighing the merits of opposing positions.
Section I surveys three competing accounts of free speech and argues
that the political approach offers the most promising starting point for
elaborating a coherent theory. Section II criticizes Meiklejohn's political
interpretation of the free speech clause and establishes the need to expand
his conception of public discourse to incorporate the end of deliberative
self-definition as a complement to that of democratic self-government. Sec-
tion III elucidates the way in which the discourse model clarifies the spe-
cial constitutional status of speech. Finally, Section IV explores the impli-
I. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960) (expanded version of A. MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)). In a recent article Lee Bollinger
referred to this conception as the "Sullivan-Kalven-Meiklejohn paradigm," which emerged in the
mid-1960's and continues to exert a pervasive influence on discussion of the theoretical underpinnings
of the First Amendment. See Bollinger, Free Speech and Intellectual Values, 92 YALE L.J. 438, 439
(1983).
2. See, e.g., Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964
(1978); Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1981).
3. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785-89 (1988).
4. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, A MATrR OF PRINCIPLE 385-93 (1985); Richards, A Theory of Free
Speech, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1837, 1893-95 (1987).
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cations of this approach for the Court's recent adjudication of some
difficult free speech problems.
I. COMPETING ACCOUNTS OF SPEECH
The free speech clause of the First Amendment serves as the center-
piece of a range of constitutional protections securing our basic civil and
political liberties. Far less apparent is the precise scope and significance of
the liberties it protects. Interpretive difficulties arise here not only because
it is hard to say exactly what forms of speech are covered by the prohibi-
tion of Congressional restrictions on freedom of expression, but also be-
cause there does not appear to be any clear historical evidence that the
Framers themselves entertained either a coherent or recognizably familiar
theory of freedom of speech.5
Nor does the tradition of constitutional interpretation of the clause, par-
ticularly in the decisions of the Supreme Court since Schenck v. United
States' in 1919, speak in a univocal voice on the matter. Even if one takes
into account only the famous dissents (or dissenting concurrences) of Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis and the later influential opinions of Justice
Brennan in cases such as New York Times v. Sullivan,' it would be very
difficult to extract an internally consistent and systematic theory of free-
dom of expression that organizes our intuitions about what counts as
speech worthy of protection.
Still, the tradition of judicial interpretation does narrow the range of
possible answers. Broadly speaking, there are three different approaches
that have oriented both the Court and contemporary legal theorists in
their attempts to identify those distinctive features of speech that warrant
special constitutional protection.
A. Three Models of Speech
According to the first view, freedom of speech must be understood as an
inviolable "negative liberty" that is protected by an absolute right to indi-
vidual self-expression. Freedom of expression serves here primarily as an
"opportunity-concept": It is the freedom to say (or not to say) whatever
one wants, irrespective of content or context, to affirm whatever beliefs
5. Indeed, the passage of the Sedition Act in 1798, only seven years after the adoption of the Bill
of Rights, suggests that there was hardly an initial consensus as to whether the First Amendment is
designed to protect speech sharply critical of the government from the imposition of criminal sanc-
tions, including imprisonment. Leonard Levy argues that "neither the Revolution nor the First
Amendment superseded the common law by repudiating the Blackstonian concept that freedom of the
press meant merely freedom from prior restraint." L. LEVY, CONsTrrTioNAL OPINIONS 162 (1986).
This implies in particular that there was no repudiation of the concept that the government may be
criminally assaulted merely by the expression of critical opinions about its performance. In this con-
nection, see also H. KALVEN, A WORTHY TRADITION 63-68 (1988).
6. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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and attitudes one chooses. The idea is that one's beliefs, opinions and atti-
tudes are distinctively one's own, much like one's own body or personal
property. The state's attempts to interfere with expression of one's beliefs
is, therefore, a violation of one of the most basic prerogatives of personal
liberty.'
The second conception characterizes freedom of speech in more positive
terms as a distinctive domain of self-actualization. On this view individu-
als cultivate a sense of themselves and their values through exercising the
liberty of self-expression. Here the scope of the liberty is more limited
than that warranted by the first model: Only those forms of speech that
somehow promote the values of self-development or self-actualization
merit protection. This view also tends to stress the importance of exposure
to divergent forms of self-expression as a condition of full self-
development."
The third model conceives of freedom of speech as a condition of our
exercise of political liberty. That is, we enjoy freedom of speech only inso-
far as it is necessary for us to carry out the function of self-government, to
serve as members of a community of common political deliberation: "The
First Amendment does not protect a 'freedom to speak.' It protects the
freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which weCgovern.' ,0
In recent discussion of First Amendment theory, this third perspective
has acquired a certain pre-eminence that is partly due to superior clar-
ity.11 In contrast, the defects of the first two approaches are readily appar-
ent. The first view construes the free speech clause as excluding govern-
mental restraint of all expressive activities and thus ignores the many
ordinary contexts in which the government imposes constraints on speech
8. This conception of freedom of expression is invoked with powerful effect in two often-cited
cases in which it is alleged that the state tried to compel individuals to affirm beliefs they did not hold.
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977).
9. This idea underlies Holmes' recommendation in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), that we must suspend absolute faith in "the very foundations of [our]
own conduct" and subject our views to the test of "free trade in ideas." It also plays a part in Bran-
deis' claim in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) that free
speech must be protected because "[t]hose who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties." The function of speech in promoting the
values of individual self-realization and self-fulfillment is emphasized in T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970), and has more recently served as the fundamental principle for
free speech theorists such as Martin Redish and C. Edwin Baker. See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984); Baker, supra note 2.
10. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 255; see also A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 1, at 26 ("The First Amendment, then, is not the guardian of unregulated
talkativeness . . . .What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth
saying shall be said.")
11. It has the virtue, as Harry Kalven has noted, of assigning the First Amendment a "central
meaning" anchored in the purposes of our republican system of government. It provides a clear an-
swer to the question of which forms of speech are covered under this amendment and why they
warrant such unconditional protection. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191.
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without raising any serious First Amendment concerns, such as regulation
of speech related to economic activity, prohibition of unruly conduct, and
decrees against slander, libel, and conspiracy to commit crimes. In other
words, this view fails to address the need to formulate some criterion of
relevance distinguishing that domain of our liberty that qualifies as "free-
dom of speech" from other expressive activities not covered by this clause.
The second model faces this demand, but remains too inclusive. There are
many speech acts, after all, that might be construed as promoting one's
self-actualization (for example, engaging in betting, fraud, or extortion),
but are surely not protected under the First Amendment. More impor-
tantly, the promotion of perfectionist ends is not a function that applies
exclusively to speech. We can realize our potential or perfect our talents
by pursuing a wide range of non-communicative activities."
But the political interpretation of the free speech clause is also defective.
The type of speech covered by promoting the principal end of self-
government fails to accord with our common understanding of the wide
spectrum of expression worthy of protection, and thus this model fails to
provide a sufficiently comprehensive foundation for a theory of free
speech.
13
B. The Standpoint of Current Theory
For some critics this objection marks a fatal weakness in the political
account of speech. Consequently, they either renounce a unified theory
altogether in favor of an eclectic view"4 or seek refuge in an alternative
systematic principle, such as toleration, self-realization, or minimizing the
harms of state intervention. 5 In so doing, however, they fail to take full
measure of the most important advance marked by the political interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment: namely, its recognition that our commitment
to freedom of expression is anchored in its promoting a public framework
of discourse in which unrestricted common deliberation on matters of mu-
tual interest is secured from the arbitrary intrusion of state power.
If we restrict our attention to the relationship between the solitary indi-
vidual and his linguistic expressions, we cannot explain either the scope of
12. This argument is developed at greater length in Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw.
U.L. REV. 1284, 1289-93 (1983).
13. The proponents of the political interpretation have tried to meet this objection by exploiting
the sense in which certain non-political forms of expression (such as art and literature) indirectly
promote our appreciation of political values. However, as we shall see in Section II, this strategy is
unconvincing.
14. See, e.g., Alexander & Horton, The Impossibility of a Free Speech Principle, 78 Nw. U.L.
REV. 1319 (1983); Cass, The Perils of Positive Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative
First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1987); Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and
the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1615 (1987).
15. See, e.g., L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986); M. REDISH, supra note 9; F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ENQUIRY (1982).
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our First Amendment liberties or their underlying rationale. This is pre-
cisely the common problem with the first two approaches. In contrast, the
political interpretation understands the speech protected by the First
Amendment principally within the context of a field of communicative
interaction in which agents are engaged in public discussion of their most
fundamental values, beliefs, and attitudes. The protection afforded expres-
sion in this context is designed to ensure that the outcome of this conversa-
tion will be determined by the persuasiveness of the reasons agents them-
selves adduce in support of their values and beliefs, not by the dictates of
arbitrary power or prejudice sponsored by the state.1 6
But the difficulty with the exclusively political approach to the free
speech clause is that this idea is worked out within a systematic perspec-
tive too narrow to encompass all those forms of expression we regard as
worthy of constitutional protection. We need to expand this idea of public
discourse to include not only speech that is necessary to advance the pro-
cess of self-government, but also speech that is necessary to advance the
process of individual self-definition. We engage in such public discussion
not only about matters of common political interest central to the project
of self-government, but also about matters of overlapping individual inter-
est having to do with the persuasiveness of those religious, philosophical,
moral, aesthetic, and personal ideals that shape the contours of our own
self-conceptions. The end of this discourse is not to master the collective
challenge of governing a democratic polity but to master the individual
challenge of governing ourselves, that is, to define deliberatively those val-
ues, ideals and conceptions of the good that set the terms by which each of
us organizes his own life. We single out certain forms of expression (for
example, scientific-philosophical, literary, and aesthetic expression) for
special constitutional protection because only by so doing can the integrity
and independence of this debate be secured from arbitrary state intrusion
in a way that parallels the independence of political debate.
This Note aims to defend a two-pronged conception of public discourse
that provides a suitably comprehensive framework for understanding the
full range of expressive activities that we regard as entitled to protection
under the free speech clause. This model captures the insights of the sec-
ond and third approaches identified above. But in contrast to the second
approach, the protection of expressive speech is grounded in the need to
promote a "public sphere" of unrestricted debate in which citizens can
deliberatively define both their collective and individual purposes. 7
16. Affirmation of the value of free speech is, as Brandeis eloquently remarked in his concurrence
in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927), inseparable from "[blelieving in the power of
reason as applied through public discussion . .. ."
17. This idea of a framework of public discourse lends a more lucid formulation to the "market-
place of ideas" metaphor that has haunted the rhetoric of the Court from Holmes to Brennan. For an
interesting discussion of the subtle changes in meaning effected in the shift from Holmes' metaphor of
"free trade in ideas" to Brennan's invocation of the "marketplace of ideas," see Cole, Agon at Agora:
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II. A CRITIQUE OF THE POLITICAL VIEW AND EXPANSION OF THE
MODEL
A. The Limits of Public Speech
There is an arresting simplicity to the contention that the protection of
speech afforded by the First Amendment is grounded in the political im-
peratives of self-government. As Meiklejohn argues, we need to specify
some "rational principle" that will allow us to demarcate the range of
expressive liberties falling under the absolute protection of the First
Amendment. This principle can be found in the fundamental choice of the
people, embodied in the Constitution, to submit to a system of government
in which they retain the ultimate basis of authority. It follows that the
government cannot deny the people the right to express and hear those
political ideas, attitudes, or beliefs that they choose because to do so would
be to interfere with their responsibility as citizens to govern themselves.
Their assumption of this responsibility requires that they enjoy un-
restricted access to whatever ideas, points of view, or information may
prove necessary to make intelligent decisions about governing matters.
Meiklejohn is careful to extend this special First Amendment protection
only to speech related to the end of political self-government. He distin-
guishes this speech from a more limited, "private" liberty of speech that is
subject to abridgment under the due process clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment, a liberty he characterizes as "the right to speak one's mind as one
chooses ... 8
Meiklejohn's argument for reserving First Amendment protection solely
to public speech concerning political matters is: (1) that under Article
One, section six, the Constitution affords "absolute protection" to the
speech of our political representatives, and as representatives derive their
governing power from citizens, the latter must enjoy at least as much pro-
tection as their elected agents;19 and (2) that the provisions of the First
Amendment must be interpreted "in relation to the intention and struc-
ture of the Constitution as a whole,"2 and thus the protection of speech
must be understood in light of the fundamental constitutional end of es-
tablishing a republican system of government.
But this argument is inadequate. While it is undeniable that one of the
intentions inscribed in the Constitution is to establish a republican system
of government, this is surely not the sole or even the overriding intention.
Meiklejohn appeals to the Preamble as an important interpretive re-
Creative Misreading in the First Amendment Tradition, 95 YALE L.J. 857, 886, 894 (1986).
18. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 37.
19. "The freedom which we grant to our representatives is merely a derivative of the prior free-
dom which belongs to us as voters." Id. at 36.
20. Meiklejohn, supra note 10, at 253.
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source,21 and this states that the Constitution is designed to "secure the
Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." But the "Blessings of
Liberty" include not merely the political liberty to participate in collective
self-government; they also include the individual liberty to define the fun-
damental ends and purposes of one's own life in the absence of unwar-
ranted intrusion. To this Meiklejohn would respond that it is only the
Second through Ninth Amendments that are devoted to ensuring that
"due regard shall be paid to the private 'rights of the governed.' " In con-
trast, he argues, "The First and Tenth Amendments protect the governing
'powers' of the people from abridgment by the agencies which are estab-
lished as their servants."22
But the first clause of the First Amendment does not have to do primar-
ily with protection of the people's governing powers, but with the right of
each person to worship freely in accordance with his own religious convic-
tions.23 This clause most emphatically does not protect a nationally de-
fined public liberty or governing power, since its purpose is to set the
prescription of preferred forms of religious worship entirely outside the
province of the legislative power and to secure the free exercise of reli-
gious liberty from governmental intrusion. It is thus inaccurate to charac-
terize the First Amendment as concerned exclusively with the protection
of public liberties or governing powers. There is every reason to think that
in extending immunity from legislative abridgment to free speech it is not
only speech's public function of promoting self-government, but also its
private function of promoting the liberties of thought and conscience that
is entitled to full protection.2 On the continuum of private and public
liberties designated in the First Amendment, freedom of speech stands
somewhere in the middle-that is, somewhere between freedom of reli-
gious worship and freedom to petition the government for a redress of
grievances.
23
Meiklejohn's reading of the First Amendment evinces a distinct prefer-
ence for the liberties of the ancients, to use Benjamin Constant's phrase,
over the liberties of the moderns. On his conception, the citizen's liberty to
21. Id.
22. Id. at 254.
23. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. '
24. D.AJ. Richards calls attention to the fact that in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions
Madison himself argued that the liberties of religious conscience and freedom of speech had to be
conceived as essentially linked. See Richards, supra note 4, at 1873.
25. At least part of the reason that Meiklejohn may be inclined to segregate "public" and "pri-
vate" speech in this way and to relegate "private speech" to the weaker protection of the Fifth
Amendment is that he tends to identify private speech with expression that is selfishly or commercially
motivated. But someone who expresses himself about matters of fundamental personal conviction re-
lating, for example, to his moral or religious ideals is not engaged in public speech for the common
welfare but at the same time is not motivated by selfish, egoistic concerns. Rather, he is engaged in
public discourse about individual ideals, and the purpose of this discourse is to advance the delibera-
tive self-definition of the agents who participate in it.
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participate actively in common deliberation about shared public goods has
priority over what he terms the merely "private" rights of the individual
to exchange views with others on matters of fundamental personal convic-
tion. The First Amendment, however, will not support such a partial con-
strual of its meaning: The conception of liberty it invokes bridges the di-
viding line separating private from public autonomy. 6
B. The Problem of Scope and Rationale
Nor is it clear that the exclusively political approach will succeed in
extending the shield of First Amendment protection to all those forms of
expression we regard as worthy of it. In particular, scientific, literary,
philosophical, and artistic forms of expression appear to be in an espe-
cially vulnerable position, as they do not evidence any noticably direct
relation to the protected domain of speech, that is, to public discussion of
matters pertaining to political self-government.
Meiklejohn tries to address this problem by insisting that ostensibly
non-political forms of communication whose free expression we value,
such as science, philosophy, art, and literature, are also entitled to protec-
tion under his principle because they promote "the knowledge, intelli-
gence, sensitivity to human values . . . which, so far as possible, a ballot
should express. ' '28 The problem with this "indirect" method of justifying
the extension of protection is that, as Bork points out, it is indiscrimi-
nately broad in principle.29 There are many different experiences and so-
cial relationships that contribute to our appreciation of political values
and to the development of our ability to exercise reasoned judgment in
political affairs. But it would be implausible to argue that for this reason
the First Amendment exempts all speech (or, more broadly, symbolic con-
26. In this respect the reading of the First Amendment advanced here diverges from that elabo-
rated by D.A.J. Richards. See D.A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986);
Richards, supra note 4. Richards thinks that the background right underlying the free speech guaran-
tee is "the right to conscience, interpretively central to religion clause jurisprudence." D.A.J. RICH-
ARDS, supra, at 166. However, this is only one half of the rationale for exempting speech from
governmental abridgment. The right to conscience only undergirds the protection we extend to speech
that is related to matters of individual self-definition as in, for example, our choice of religious convic-
tions and conceptions of our individual good. We do not protect political speech principally in order to
sustain the liberties of individual conscience, but rather in order to sustain our liberties as citizens to
deliberate in common about the shared goods of association. Richards' reduction of the foundation of
the free speech principle to the "inalienable right to conscience," see Richards, supra note 4, at
1892-93, 1896, is based on an underestimation of the force of Meiklejohn's argument from democracy
and on a contestable neo-Kantian conception of the person.
27. In this respect Robert Bork's conclusion that only explicitly political forms of speech are enti-
tled to First Amendment protection should not be regarded as an eccentric development of
Meiklejohn's own views; it is in some ways the most natural implication to draw from Meiklejohn's
starting-point. See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
27-29 (1971).
28. Meiklejohn, supra note 10, at 256.
29. See Bork, supra note 27, at 27.
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duct) constitutive of these experiences and relationships from governmen-
tal regulation.30
The problem with Meiklejohn's broadly defined political criterion,
however, is not merely that it is overinclusive. More importantly, this
model of justification misconceives the grounds for affording protection to
forms of expression such as art, philosophy, and literature. We do not
want to shield them from governmental intrusion primarily because they
promote our capacity to participate in political discussion, but because
they raise issues concerning cognitive, moral, and aesthetic values whose
resolution is best left to our own independent deliberation and judgment,
free from the dictates of governmental authority.
The unimpeded discussion of artistic, ethical, religious, and personal
ideals (including sexual matters) is primarily valued not as a means or
preparation for deliberation about the common political good, but as
something directly relevant for the determination of our own respective
individual goods, as the medium in which we articulate, promote, defend,
and criticize those values and ideals that define who we are and what we
care about as individuals. The aim in asserting the exemption of this dis-
course from the intrusion of governmental authority is not to secure the
independence of citizens as rulers of the polity, but rather the indepen-
dence of citizens as rulers of themselves. That is, it serves to secure their
status as persons who can deliberatively define for themselves their ideals
and visions of the good through an unrestrained discourse in which such
ideals are reciprocally formulated, criticized, and defended by fellow
citizens.
C. A Two-Pronged Model of Speech
The politically centered account of the foundation of freedom of expres-
sion must therefore be expanded to incorporate deliberative discussion
about matters that have primarily to do not with how we should collec-
tively govern our community, but rather with how we should individually
govern ourselves and our own lives. The end of such discussion is not the
well-informed or wise exercise of the political liberties, but the well-
30. Most of the communication constitutive of our primary socialization process and early educa-
tion would qualify as centrally important in shaping our "sensitivity to human values." Similarly, our
expressive involvement in many adult social relationships, whether professional, economic or intimate,
also shapes our political attitudes and beliefs, often in quite unforseen and possibly productive ways.
Surely the speech connected with such relationships is not protected under the First Amendment
merely because it affects our political attitudes.
Meiklejohn's view also faces a special problem with respect to works of art and literature, especially
those that aspire to occupy a place in the avant-garde. In view of the way in which our assessment of
the value of such works is subject to a continual process of retrospective reassessment, it may be
difficult for the Court at any given time to place confidence in its judgment that a given work should
be protected because, as Meiklejohn proposes, it promotes "sensitivity to human values." Meiklejohn,
supra note 10, at 256.
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informed or wise exercise of the liberties of self-definition.31 We need a
two-pronged model of freedom of expression: One dimension protects ex-
plicitly political speech to promote the end of democratic self-government,
and the other dimension protects those forms of non-political expression
that are directed toward a consideration of the range of values, ideals, and
conceptions of the good in terms of which individuals define their sense of
themselves and what they are doing with their lives. 2
It might be thought that this model represents an uneasy compromise
between the claims of individual autonomy advanced by the first two ap-
proaches to free speech 3 and the claims of political community advanced
by the third. But recall that the problem with the first two accounts,
which alternately invoked the concept of negative liberty or positive self-
realization, is that they fail to single out any feature peculiar to speech
that would entitle it to special protection.34 In contrast, the relation be-
tween speech and individual autonomy asserted within the framework of
the two-pronged model presented above is based on a necessary connection
between freedom of speech and the possibility of what we term delibera-
tive self-definition. The claim is that we can freely and intelligently exer-
cise our freedom of choice on fundamental matters having to do with our
own individual ideals and conceptions of the good only if we have access
to an unconstrained discussion in which the merits of competing moral,
religious, aesthetic, and philosophical values are given a fair opportunity
for hearing. The two-pronged model of freedom of expression is not so
much distinguished, then, by the opposition between individual and collec-
tive autonomy as it is united by the ideal of an unconstrained public dis-
course which makes possible the deliberative deployment of distinct do-
mains of our liberty.
III. THE SPECIAL STATUS OF SPEECH
To clarify further how the discourse model answers the question of why
speech is entitled to special constitutional protection, it may be instructive
31. These are the liberties through which, in John Rawls' words, we are able to form, revise, and
rationally pursue a conception of the good. See Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysi-
cal, 14 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 223, 233 (1985).
32. I do not mean to claim that as a matter of fact these two dimensions of freedom of expression
function independently of one another, but only that they are analytically distinguishable and that the
justification for their constitutional protection rests on different grounds. In the "real world" it is
quite clear that they are intimately intertwined (in the same way, for example, that political and
moral values are) and that it would be impossible adequately to protect one dimension of speech
without at the same time extending considerable protection to the other dimension. A society that
maintains strict constraints on the public consideration of different moral points of view is not likely to
have a very wide open political debate, and, similarly, prohibiting the advocacy of certain political
points of view is likely to have large repercussions on the permissible contours of moral discussion of
alternative forms of the good life.
33. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12. For a clear exposition and critique of self-expres-
sivist and self-actualization theories of free speech, see F. SCHAUFR, supra note 15, at 47-58.
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to return to one of the "original sources" of First Amendment theory,
namely, Brandeis' concurrence in Whitney v. California." I shall focus in
particular on Robert Bork's interpretation of the famous passage in which
Brandeis tries to explain why speech is entitled to special exemption from
governmental regulation. Brandeis states:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the
State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
• ..They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as
you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth . . ..
Bork believes that this passage contains two of the most powerful rea-
sons that Brandeis identifies to justify the extension of special constitu-
tional protection to speech: (1) its contribution to developing the faculties
of the individual, and (2) its advancement of the discovery and spread of
political truth.37 But he argues that closer scrutiny of the first reason
reveals that it fails to specify anything peculiar to speech. There are many
activities that contribute to the development of our faculties, and speech is
not unique in this respect. Bork therefore concludes, following
Meikelejohn, that only the second reason provides a defensible rationale
for extending special constitutional protection to speech.
But Bork is careless in his reading of Brandeis here. The benefit to
which speech is alleged to contribute is not the development of one's facul-
ties as such, but rather "making men free to develop their faculties."3
This difference is significant because it indicates that the link to which
Brandeis is attending is not between speech and self-development, but be-
tween speech and the possibility of what we have termed deliberative self-
definition. Talking and listening to others allows us to weigh the value
and merits of rival forms of life and conceptions of the good, and thus it
makes possible a considered exploration of the range of valuative alterna-
tives. Through discourse with others we can situate ourselves within the
horizon of competing values and thus deliberatively choose how we want
to deploy our faculties. This ultimately requires us to define what kind of
life we want to live, what types of activities we want to attach value to,
and what sort of persons we want to be. Speaking with others about their
35. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 375.
37. Bork, supra note 27, at 25-26. Bork also takes notice of two other benefits of speech identified
by Brandeis as grounds for its protection: (1) its contribution to our happiness in engaging in activi-
ties, and (2) its function as a safety valve for society. Bork argues that neither of these suffices as a
reason to reserve special constitutional protection for speech. There is not space here to pursue this
aspect of Bork's critical treatment of Brandeis.
38. Schauer also fails to notice this crucial difference in appealing to Bork's argument in support
of his own critique of self-development theorists. See Schauer, supra note 12, at 1292-93.
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rival values and ideals is thus constitutively linked to the possibility of an
individual agent exercising a deliberative choice of how she wants to live.
Possessing the freedom to develop one's faculties entails seeing the ques-
tion of which faculties to develop within a horizon of possible alternative
forms of life and values. It demands that one be able to raise the question,
for example, of whether to cultivate one's acumen in effecting profitable
market exchanges, or in solving problems in scientific research, or in com-
bating social injustice by engaging in political organizing. Only through
discourse with others do we acquire the capacity to deliberate about the
deployment of our faculties in a way that situates their respective claims
to worthiness within a horizon of possible valuative alternatives. At least
in this respect, then, speech is indeed significantly different from other
social activities whose main purpose is not communicative, 39 for the latter
do not contain within themselves the possibility of surveying the alterna-
tives. Furthermore, it is arguable that this connection between speech and
the development of the freedom to define or situate oneself within a range
of possible human values by itself yields powerful grounds for protecting
freedom of expression from governmental intrusion. We can secure our
capacity "freely to develop our faculties" as we see fit (that is, to define
ourselves deliberatively) only by assuring the possibility of access to an
unrestricted public discussion, in which all the different forms of life, ide-
als and conceptions of the good current in our culture receive a fair
hearing. 0
IV. APPLICATION OF THE THEORY
This Section develops the implications of the discourse model presented
in Section II for the Supreme Court's approach to First Amendment adju-
dication. It first sets out the types of considerations this model identifies as
central for the analysis of free speech problems. Second, it aims to clarify
the significance of this framework by assessing the soundness of the
Court's reasoning in two recent cases. The discussion begins with a criti-
cal analysis of the Court's treatment of restrictions on corporate speech in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,"1 and then turns to the Court's
review of state-compelled speech in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Pub-
lic Utilities Commission of California.2
39. Bork's examples include trading on the stock market, playing tennis, working as a barmaid,
engaging in sexual activity, and pursuing one's profession as a river port pilot.
40. In this sense both levels of discourse we have specified share a common presupposition:
namely, that our own choice-whether as a political community deciding matters of public policy or
as particular persons defining our ideals or values-cannot count as rationally justified unless it is
exercised on the basis of reasons that are defensible in light of a consideration of all the relevant
alternatives.
41. 435 U.S. 765 (1977).
42. 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
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A. General Considerations
If one starts from the primacy of the discourse model of free speech, it
is apparent that an assessment of the scope of free speech rights in a given
expressive context must take account of at least two different types of in-
terests: (1) the interests of speakers to participate in the discourse, thereby
promoting those beliefs or points of view that they wish to share with a
larger audience, and (2) the interests of the audience to hear all the rele-
vant positions represented in the discussion, so that they can make an
informed decision concerning the matters which they are called upon to
judge."'
Since the discourse model views speech within an essentially public
framework of communication in which individuals are deliberating about
common political goods or matters of individual self-definition, audience
interests must be accorded a substantial (though by no means exclusive)
amount of weight in fixing the boundaries of free speech rights." The
chief function of protecting speech is to promote agents' deliberative au-
tonomy (on both the collective and individual level) and not to further
their interests in either self-expression or self-development for its own
sake. It follows, then, that those who take part in this discourse have a
crucial interest in hearing a diversity of viewpoints on the issues that come
under discussion; only in this way will they be in a position freely to
consider the supporting reasons underlying the relevant alternatives.
Contrary to the traditional individualistic conception, the scope of free
speech rights cannot be adequately specified by considering their effects
only upon individuals' interests in participating in discussion. If one treats
these interests as absolute (as is characteristic of the traditional view)45
and asserts that each individual has an unconditional right to express his
views to the larger audience, it may well be that in certain situations audi-
ence interests in hearing a diversity of viewpoints will be sacrificed and
43. The general role of participant and audience interests in defining the range of free speech
rights has been explored in some detail by T.M. Scanlon in Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and
Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REV. 519, 521-27 (1979). Although his focus tends to be
considerably narrower, D.A.J. Richards also discusses the reciprocal interplay between speaker and
audience rights in D.A.J. RICHARDS, supra note 26, at 170-71. Richards is concerned mainly with
the rights (and not interests) of speakers to reach audiences of their choice and the rights of audiences
to hear speakers of their choice. The role of audience interests in Scanlon's (and Meiklejohn's) con-
ception is far more comprehensive. It takes into account the audience's interest in hearing a diversity
of views that will promote its deliberative autonomy, including views of which the audience may not
be aware or which it may prefer not to hear.
44. Audience interests must not be accorded exclusive weight here. It is clear that a concern for
deliberative autonomy entails not merely that we have the chance to listen to a diversity of views, but
also that we have the opportunity actively to participate in critical discussion of these views. See
Buchanan, Autonomy and Categories of Expression: A Reply To Professor Scanlon, 40 U. PiTr. L.
REv. 551, 553 (1979).
45. The first and second approaches identified in Section I would qualify as traditional views,
although as noted some versions of the self-realization approach accord weight to listener as well as
participant interests. See Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to
Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 679 (1982).
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thus the fundamental purpose of free speech will be frustrated. This is
especially the case in situations in which the public space of discourse is
marked by a condition of scarcity, so that not all prospective participants
can be accommodated within the framework of a discussion marked by
limitations of time and audience attention span. Under such circumstances
some source of authority must determine which speakers should be al-
lowed to express their views (and which should be excluded), and it would
be a perversion of the idea of free speech to claim that speakers who are
given an opportunity to speak because they are articulate spokesmen for
unrepresented viewpoints thereby violate the free speech rights of those
who have necessarily been overlooked.4
This perspective on the problem of free speech is, of course, not entirely
unfamiliar to the Court. It has made its way into the reasoning of the
majority opinion in cases like Lamont v. Postmaster General, in which
the Court declared a right not merely to distribute political literature but
also to receive it.47 It played an even more prominent role in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, in which the Court emphasized the priority of
the rights of viewers and listeners over those of broadcasters and insisted
that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhib-
ited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee." 48
Nonetheless, the Court has been reluctant to apply this model systemat-
ically to all cases of public speech and has instead restricted it to the spe-
cial technological circumstances of the broadcasting media, that is, scarcity
of broadcast frequencies. From the vantage point of the discourse model,
however, such a systemic approach, which defines the scope of free speech
rights in relation to the way they affect relevant participant and audience
interests, is justified in all cases involving discourse about public matters
and not just in the special instances of television and radio broadcasting.
The discourse model requires balancing audience and participant interests
in specifying the range of free speech rights because only in this way can
the key function of protecting speech-namely, promoting agents' capacity
for deliberative choice-be adequately secured.
The Court has also been relatively insensitive to the question of how to
decide when it is important to be solicitous of audience interests and when
participant interests must take priority. From the standpoint of the dis-
46. It is arguable that the idea of free speech itself (and not merely the idea of equality) requires
that some principle of selection, sensitive to audience interests, be employed in allocating opportunities
to speak. From the standpoint of the discourse model, the failure to do so, in the name of sustaining
unconditional participant rights, would undermine the very point of protecting speech. As Meiklejohn
correctly observes, in public debate "[w]hat is essential is not that everyone speak, but that everything
worth saying shall be said." A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLrICAL FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 26.
47. 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965).
48. 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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course model, audience interests must be given preeminent weight in cases
of explicitly political debate because the paramount concern here is that
citizens be able to make wise, well-informed choices about matters of
shared public concern. Hence, regulation of the exercise of participant
rights, through policies such as the fairness doctrine, state subsidies for
under-represented speech, or restrictions on individual as well as corpo-
rate expenditures, might well be consistent with (if not mandated by) the
requirements of the First Amendment. The presumption is that (1) the
fundamental consideration in this domain is to enable citizens to make the
most intelligent choices possible concerning matters of collective self-
governance, and (2) this end is best promoted by ensuring consideration of
the spectrum of alternative points of view on issues of public dispute.
As argued in Section II, however, the grounds for protecting non-
political speech diverge from those underpinning political speech. The end
of non-political discourse is primarily to promote the deliberative possibil-
ity of individual self-definition and not collective self-governance. This im-
plies that in the non-political sphere-that is, in discussion concerning
moral, aesthetic, or religious values or ideals-participant interests must
be accorded greater weight in defining the scope of free speech rights. The
two-pronged discourse model indicates that in the framework of this sort
of discussion participants are engaged primarily in the deliberative process
of individual self-definition. For this reason the actual exercise of their
right to participate (as opposed to their right to hear a spectrum of views)
possesses a centrality greater than that involved in a discussion about the
common good.49 Agents within this type of discourse are trying to clarify
the constitutive features of their own identities, and the opportunity genu-
inely to participate in a discourse-that is, to take on an "articulate"
identity and defend it against challenge by others-marks one crucial way
in which individuals are able to delineate and modify their self-
conceptions.
B. The Court's Treatment of Restricted and Compelled Speech
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,0 the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of a state statute that prohibited banks and business cor-
porations from making certain expenditures designed to influence the vote
on referendum proposals, in particular on a proposal to amend the state
49. To be sure, this can at best serve only as a relative distinction. We can imagine many cases in
which audience interests outweigh participant interests even in areas as ostensibly non-political as
aesthetic expression. Consider, for example, a government attempt to suppress the works of a small
but important group of avant-garde painters. Surely we would view this as a more serious abridg-
ment of freedom of expression than the state's refusal to issue a permit allowing a large number of
painting afficionados from a local YMCA to exhibit their sketches on a well-trafficked street in an
urban center, despite the fact that in the latter case a greater number of rights to participant expres-
sion might be harmed.
50. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
constitution to authorize a graduated individual income tax. The Court
ruled that the prohibition of corporate expenditures related to the referen-
dum proposal abridged the corporation's First Amendment right to par-
ticipate in public discussion of governmental affairs and was for this rea-
son unconstitutional.
What is perhaps most conspicuous about Justice Powell's majority
opinion in Bellotti is the rather selective (and ultimately arbitrary) use the
Court makes of the concept of the priority of audience interests in afford-
ing First Amendment protection to corporate speech while denying the
state legislature the authority to limit corporate expenditures in order to
promote a broader spectrum of public debate. From the vantage point of a
discourse theory of speech, the Court's reasoning in Bellotti is strikingly
inconsistent: It invokes the contribution to public debate standard in ex-
tending protection to corporate speech, but is utterly indifferent to this
standard in weighing the rationale for the state statute limiting corporate
expenditures.
In evaluating the extent to which corporate speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection, the majority opinion in Bellotti is entirely oriented
to an audience interest criterion. The question is whether the speech
makes a significant contribution to public debate."1 This orientation is em-
inently well-justified. When speech is addressed to the public in the con-
text of political debate, the preeminent consideration is that all the rele-
vant viewpoints receive a fair hearing and not that each participant
exercise his opportunity to speak.5" Indeed, the Court leaves open the pos-
sibility that the participant rights of corporations in exercising their First
Amendment liberties may not be as extensive as those pertaining to indi-
viduals, for corporations do not have the same interest in self-expression
as individuals.5" Within the framework of the controversy at issue in Bel-
lotti, however, this does not matter. For if speech is addressed to a public
discussion of political issues and has informative value (i.e., satisfies audi-
ence interests), this by itself assures the speech of a prima facie claim to
First Amendment protection.
In assessing the First Amendment claims of corporate speech, then, the
51. As Justice Powell puts it, the issue is "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
capacity for informing the public." Id. at 777.
52. The Court itself appears to recognize this by emphasizing that in this context it is a mistake to
focus on the source of the speech-the corporation-in evaluating whether its speech warrants
protection.
It is interesting that in criticizing the Bellotti decision C. Edwin Baker focuses on precisely this
issue-namely, the source of the speech-and argues that corporate speech "should not be protected,
because these communications do not derive from the values or political commitments of any individu-
als." Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's The Value
of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 646, 652 (1982). This follows from Baker's view that only those
expressive activities that directly promote the self-realization of individuals should be protected. For
Redish's critical response which invokes an audience interest standard within the context of a self-
realization approach, see Redish, supra note 45, at 679.
53. 435 U.S. at 777 & n.13.
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majority adheres to a standard that corresponds roughly to that recom-
mended by the discourse model." Where Justice Powell goes awry is in
his countervailing assessment of the interests of the state in restricting cor-
porate expenditures on speech. Precisely the same First Amendment con-
sideration-namely, concern for audience interests in hearing a diversity
of viewpoints-might well justify the legislative restriction on corporate
expenditures for speech. The function of the state statute is to limit the
participant rights of the corporation by not allowing it to spend money on
advertising in order to ensure that the other voices in the debate will have
sufficient room in the space of public discourse to receive a fair hearing.55
In this sense the legislature's statute might be likened in function to the
rule of a moderator at a town meeting, who is guided in his selection of
speakers by the goal of maximizing the diversity of points of view.56
Justice Powell never clearly acknowledges that the First Amendment
considerations justifying the imposition of restrictions on corporate ex-
penditures for speech stand on exactly the same footing as the considera-
tions justifying its protection-namely, the promotion of audience interests
in hearing the relevant positions articulated in debate. In characterizing
the state's concerns in restricting corporate expenditures for speech, he
focuses instead on "sustaining the active role of the individual citizen in
the electoral process and thereby preventing diminution of the citizen's
confidence in government."57 In this description Powell only obliquely
touches on the legitimate First Amendment audience interests that moti-
vate the statute. At a later point Powell comes closer to the real matter at
issue by alluding to appellee's argument that "corporations are wealthy
and powerful and their views may drown out other points of view."5"
Nonetheless, he quickly dismisses the force of this argument by insisting
that this concern could justify restricting corporate advocacy only if it
"threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes." 59 On Pow-
ell's own premises, however, this requirement is far too strong. The state
should only have the burden of showing that the audience interests that
justify protecting this advocacy are weaker than those warranting its
regulation.
54. In this connection, see id. at 782 n.18, where Justice Powell appeals to the interest of voters in
Massachusetts, "who would be as interested in hearing appellants' views on a graduated tax as the
views of media corporations that might be less knowledgeable on the subject."
55. As Justice White correctly points out in his dissent, the statute will not have the effect of
eliminating the corporation's point of view from public discussion, since individual officers, directors,
and stockholders remain free to publicize these views at their own expense. The point is only to
ensure that opposing points of view also have sufficient opportunity to reach the attention of the
public. Id. at 808-09 (White, J., dissenting).
56. In this connection, see Harry Kalven's contrast between regulations such as Robert's Rules of
Order and content regulation in Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23.
57. 435 U.S. at 787.
58. Id. at 789.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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Perhaps because he is aware of this flaw in his argument Powell finds
it necessary to butress the authority of his decision by invoking the so-
called Buckley dictum that "the concept that government may restrict the
speech of some ... in order to enhance the relative voice of others is
wholly foreign to the First Amendment . *. .. Powell's appeal to this
dictum is particularly ironic in view of his own starting point in Bellotti.
For the Buckley dictum treats the speaker's participant rights as absolute,
immune from government qualification in light of competing First
Amendment audience interests that might favor a more diverse regime of
speaker participation.
The idea of fixed and absolute participant rights did not inform Pow-
ell's treatment of corporate speech at the outset, and his recourse to the
Buckley dictum in concluding his decision reflects a curious reversal of
field. This reversal is made possible by the failure to recognize that audi-
ence interests must assume priority in fixing the scope of free speech
rights in political debate and that the unconditional claims made on behalf
of speakers' participant rights simply do not make sense in this sphere of
discourse. If the Court had possessed a clearer grasp of the proper place of
audience interests in defining the scope of participant rights in political
debate (as elaborated in the discourse model), it might not have been so
easy for it to deploy this concept with the striking inconsistency that char-
acterizes its reasoning in Bellotti.
In the Pacific Gas case we can detect a similar failure on the part of
the Supreme Court to exercise sufficient care in applying distinct stan-
dards of First Amendment adjudication to specific contexts of discourse.
At issue in this case is the constitutionality of a requirement of the Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission that four times a year a privately
owned utility company include in its billing envelopes the speech of a
public interest group with which the company disagrees. The private util-
ity company, Pacific Gas, had distributed to its customers over a period of
sixty-two years a newsletter in its monthly billing envelopes, and the state
utility commission determined that requiring Pacific Gas to distribute the
message of an alternative citizens' group four times a year would benefit
the interests of its customers by exposing them to a variety of views on
public utility issues.
The central question posed by this case is whether compelling Pacific
Gas to disseminate the message of a group whose views it does not en-
dorse is a sufficiently serious infringement of its First Amendment rights
to make the Commission's requirement unconstitutional. It is significant
that in taking up this question the Court starts from the same premise
that it advanced in Bellotti: namely, that the corporate speech of Pacific
Gas is itself entitled to First Amendment protection because it promotes
60. Id. at 790-91 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976)).
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audience interests by contributing to the "'discussion, debate, and the dis-
semination of information and ideas' that the First Amendment seeks to
foster.""1 Just as in Bellotti, however, the Court underplays the extent to
which it is exactly the same First Amendment considerations that provide
the underlying rationale for granting the citizens' group, TURN, periodic
access to Pacific Gas' billing envelopes.
Instead of engaging in a balancing of First Amendment harms and ben-
efits that are implied by conceding TURN occasional access to Pacific
Gas' envelopes, the Court focuses exclusively on the harms or "burdens"
to Pacific Gas' First Amendment participant rights that are imposed by
compelling access. The harms to Pacific Gas' rights are threefold: (1) It
forfeits its right not to speak, because it will have to respond to TURN's
claims; (2) It is compelled to serve as a means for disseminating views
with which it does not agree; and (3) It suffers forced public identification
with beliefs to which it does not actually subscribe. Even if one concedes
that these impositions represent genuine burdens on Pacific Gas' exercise
of its First Amendment rights, they must be weighed against the promo-
tion of First Amendment interests served by granting TURN periodic ac-
cess to Pacific Gas' customers.
But the real problem with Justice Powell's majority opinion lies at a
deeper level. The Court is employing a model of First Amendment harms
here that makes sense within the context of non-political discourse related
to what we termed the liberties of self-definition, but not with regard to
debate about matters of general political interest. The negative free speech
rights not to speak and not to associate oneself with repugnant beliefs
have paradigmatic application in self-definitional discourse because here
agents are concerned with identifying those values and ideals that corre-
spond to their sense of who they truly are as individuals and what they
stand for. Compelling them to speak or to associate with beliefs they do
not hold constitutes a basic violation of their fundamental liberties of
thought and conscience.62
It is for this reason that Powell must repeatedly invoke the precedents
of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette" and Wooley v.
Maynard64 in support of his opinion. Both of these cases involved state
regulations in which individuals were forced to associate with views that
sharply violated their fundamental religious convictions. In the context of
corporate speech addressed to political debate, however, these precedents
lose equivalent force. What is primarily at stake in political debate is not
the individual's aim to clarify and affirm the basic terms of his identity,
but the community's ambition to choose the wisest, most prudent policies.
61. 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783).
62. See id. at 32-33 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
64. 430 U.S. 705 (1977); see also supra note 8.
1990]
The Yale Law Journal
Does Pacific Gas really have a fundamental constitutional right to remain
silent in the course of a debate in which it has been the sole voice address-
ing its customers for sixty-two years and has a monopoly on the means of
access to its audience? Does it suffer from public identification with be-
liefs that it does not hold when it is given ample opportunity to include a
disclaimer in its billing envelops distinguishing its own views on public
issues from those of TURN? Finally, are its constitutional rights truly
compromised by serving as an occasional vehicle for the distribution of
views it does not endorse when it owes its own First Amendment protec-
tion to its promotion of the very same interests that would also be served
by granting periodic access to TURN? To respond affirmatively to these
questions is to extend the concept of negative free speech rights beyond the
domain of its proper application.
V. CONCLUSION
The analysis of Bellotti and Pacific Gas indicates that what is missing
from the Court's reasoning is sufficient consideration of the limited con-
texts in which its application of specific elements of First Amendment doc-
trine is justified. As we have seen, the assorted doctrinal claims deployed
by the Court range from an assertion of the centrality of speech for demo-
cratic self-government to an insistence upon the primacy of negative free
speech rights to an affirmation of the unabridgeable status of participant
rights. The Court's employment of such doctrine is vitiated by its failure
to clarify the relationship between the paradigmatic contexts in which the
application of specific doctrine may be warranted and the particular cir-
cumstances of adjudication in which such doctrine is actually invoked.
Closer attention to the contexts of adjudication would demonstrate that the
appeal to such rigid doctrines is one-sided and in some cases (for example,
Pacific Gas) entirely inappropriate, because the categories of expression
and the relevant interests involved in these cases require doctrines of a
quite different sort. Until the Court makes a more systematic effort to
relate its use of free speech doctrine to the actual categories of expression
(political, moral, personal and aesthetic) in which free speech is exercised
and to the relevant range of interests involved within each of these differ-
ent categories, it will be unable to dispel the impression that its use of
such doctrine serves the end of selective rationalization rather than rea-
soned judgment.
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